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Abstract
We compare three methods for the elicitation of time preferences in an experi-
mental setting: the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak procedure (BDM); the second price
auction; and the multiple price list format. The first two methods have been used
rarely to elicit time preferences. All methods used are perfectly equivalent from a
decision theoretic point of view, and they should induce the same ‘truthful’ rev-
elation i dominant strategies. In spite of this, we find that framing does matter:
the money discount rates elicited with the multiple price list tend to be higher
than those elicited with the other two methods. In addition, our results shed some
light on attitudes towards time, and they permit a broad classification of subjects
depending on how the size of the elicited values varies with the time horizon.
J.E.L. codes: C91, D9
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1 Introduction
Many experimental studies elicit preference parameters (such as risk aversion or discount
rates) from subjects. In economics experiments, a major preoccupation is that of making
the elicitation incentive compatible: the ‘true’ response should be the dominant response
for the subject among the available ones, whatever her true parameter happens to be.
Often, for a given parameter to be elicited, there exists several elicitation mechanisms
that are both a priori appealing and incentive compatible, and that thus should theoret-
ically yield the same (true) response from subjects. In this study, we compare three such
theoretically equivalent incentive compatible methods for the elicitation of time prefer-
ences and test whether the theoretical equivalence is confirmed in the laboratory. In an
experimental setting we can control other factors influencing subjects’ choices: thus any
observed discrepancy can only mean that factors intrinsic to way choices are presented to
the subject, and which should be irrelevant for the agent’s response, do in fact matter.
For this reason we call such factors framing effects. Our main conclusion will be that
there is evidence of framing effects in subjects’ responses. Nevertheless we also obtain
some frame independent results that may be of interest.
A first reason for focussing on time preferences is simply the obvious importance
of the topic. Many economic decisions have a crucial time dimension (e.g. investments,
pensions) and therefore it is important to develop accurate theoretical models and reliable
empirical methods to elicit the time preferences of individuals. A second reason is that
eliciting time preferences has proven to be far from a trivial matter. For example, one
of the more puzzling findings is the wide variety of ranges for discount factors estimates
(see e.g. Table 1 in Frederick, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue [13]); and even within a
single class of preference elicitation method, results are sensitive to the details of the
experimental design (see e.g. Dohmen, Falk, Huffman and Sunde[11]). Thirdly, studies
in this vast literature do not proceed in a standard way, and many are the confounding
factors from one study to another, which hamper systematic comparisons to determine to
what extent these differences depend on the elicitation methods themselves as opposed to
other differences in experimental design. In a nutshell, at the level of experimental design
the main issues that emerge are the following:
• not all studies elicit time preferences in an incentive compatible way;
• even when an incentive compatible mechanism is used, it may still suffer from not
being sufficiently ‘robust’: as noted by Harrison [16], some elicitation methods suffer
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from serious incentive properties in the neighbourhood of the truth telling dominant
strategy: Deviations may be ‘cheap’ enough that experimental subjects do not select
the dominant strategy;1
• the above aside, some recent theoretical advances even put into serious question the
conventional interpretation of established empirical evidence.2
In this paper we compare three methods to elicit time preferences. For all of them, we
focus on eliciting the maximum amount subjects are prepared to pay in order to anticipate
receipt of a monetary reward (“speed-up” condition). We investigate whether or not the
various elicitation procedures yield consistently different results. The methods we consider
are widely used as general elicitation techniques, though not in all cases for time time
preferences. The first is the Multiple Price List Method (henceforth MPL), currently the
most used technique for preference elicitation in the time domain. In addition, the so
called Becker-DeGroot-Marschak [5] (henceforth BDM) and the ‘second price sealed bid
auction’ (henceforth ‘Auction’) are the most widely relied upon methods to elicit ‘home-
grown’ values in the goods domain. As far as we are aware, the BDM has been used
in the time domain only twice before,3 and in a paper and pencil settings as opposed
to computerised sessions. Auctions too have been used very rarely in the past for the
elicitation of time preferences, and anyhow prevalently in the psychology rather than the
economics literature.4
1See Harrison, Lau and Rutstrom [18] for other common elicitation pitfalls.
2For instance Noor [29] and Halevi [14] are recent papers challenging the conventional wisdom re-
garding hyperbolic discounting. Noor [29] starts from the observation that evidence of high impatience
toward immediate rewards is compatible not just with hyperbolic discounting, but also with experimen-
tal subjects being likely to be cash constrained; he performs a calibration exercise and shows that the
evidence is compatible with standard exponential discounting under certain additional condition. Halevi
[14] studies the relationship between time inconsistency and stationarity of time preferences, challenging
the current view that time inconsistent choices arise mainly from present biased preferences, since in his
study he finds that half of the subjects with time inconsistent choices exhibit stationary time preferences
(and one third of the subjects who are time consistent exhibit non stationary choices). More in general,
Cubitt and Read [10] discuss the problems when eliciting discount factors in the lab.
3See Manzini [25] and Benhabib, Bisin and Schotter [6].
4See e.g. Kirby and Marakovich [21], who compare real and hypothetical delayed rewards within a
first price auction mechanism, in rather small samples (22 subjects in the real reward treatment, and 20
in the hypotehtical treatment). Kirby [20] uses a second price sealed bid auction. Here, though, subjects
had to use their own money to bid to have the right to receive a delayed reward (i.e. the question asked
was “The item up for auction is $X. The most I would be willing to pay for this item immediately is ...”,
where X was a (varying) monetary amount, and subjects had to fill in the blank with their own bid. This
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More in general, papers comparing different elicitation methods for time preferences
are very few5 - yet in different domains, most notably in the pricing of goods, various
alternative methods have been employed.6
The Multiple Price List method falls into the category of choice tasks : subjects are
simply asked to choose between two different amounts available at different dates. The
other two methods, Auction and BDM are matching tasks : broadly speaking, subjects
have to specify what amount available earlier would be equivalent to a later, fixed reward.
That pricing and matching tasks can give rise to different evaluations has been known for
a long time, but in situations not involving delayed rewards.7 In the time domain, Read
and Roelofsma [36] study whether differences might emerge, and although they do find
some evidence for this (i.e. their subjects are less patient when answering choice rather
than matching questions), their experiment was conducted using hypothetical payments,
and the choice task did not use an incentive compatible mechanism.8
In our experiment the elicitation methods are incentive compatible: declaring one’s
true time preference’ is a weakly dominant strategy. Furthermore, as described in detail
in section 3, in our implementation these three elicitation methods are strategically equiv-
alent : from a standard decision theoretic point of view there is absolutely no difference
between them. The only differences are in the ways the problems are framed, and a de-
cision maker that ignores irrelevant features beside economic incentives should make the
same choices in all of them.
Contrary to this benchmark expectation, we find that the methods do differ. First of
all, money discount factors elicited with the MPL method are smaller than those elicited
experimental design is close in spirit to Horowitz [19], where subjects bid for bonds that matured with
delay. In our own experimental design the objective is to elicit the bid that makes the subject indifferent
between receiving a larger sum later (LL) or the (elicited) smaller reward sooner (SS). That is, we believe
that our experimental design makes immediately clear what SS and LL are.
5Hardisty et al. [15] compare choice (as in the MPL) and matching (as in BDM and Auctions) methods
for the elicitation of time preferences in mostly hypothetical choices, and do find differences in the results
obtained.
6See e.g. Shogren et. al [38] and Noussair et al. [30] for comparisons of auction methods and BDM.
7The first paper to uncover such differences is Lichtenstein and Slovic [23].
8A recent study addressing the difference between matching and choice task is Tokarchuk [39], who (in
samples with an average of 16 subjects per treatment) analyses differences between choice and matching
tasks in a variety of different treatments and finds that subjects are more impatient with the matching
task than with the choice task; however the elicitation mechanism used for the matching task is not
incentive compatible. Benhabib, Bisin and Schotter [6] also find differences between choice and matching
tasks though in an indirect way, as they elicit discount rates with the BDM and find higher discount
factors than Coller and Williams [9]’s choice task (MPL).
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under the two other frames. Secondly, unlike previous evidence in domains different from
time,9 we find that the BDM and the Auction method provide similar elicited values
(with some caveats). Finally, looking at individual responses we find that subjects can
be classed into three groups, broadly corresponding to increasing, decreasing and non
monotonic time preference profiles, depending on how the size of the elicited values varies
with the time horizon.10
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. We explain the elicitation methods
used in the next section, where we also describe our experimental design. We discuss
the strategic equivalence between the three elicitation methods used in section 3. The
results are reported in section 4, with further details confined to the Appendix, which
also includes the experimental instructions. Section 5 concludes.
2 Experimental design
We ran four session for each of the three treatments (MPL, BDM, second price Auctions),
with 16 subjects per session - of the 20 initial participants in each session only the fastest
16 who answered correctly a simple comprehension test (administered after reading the
instructions) continued to the experiment proper (the others were given the show up fee
and left).11
Auctions BDM MPL
Male 35 34 35
Female 29 30 29
Total 64 64 64
Table 1: The treatments
We elicited the willingness to pay to anticipate to the following day the receipt of
a e20 otherwise available with three different delays, of 1, 2 and 4 months (as in e.g.
Harrison, Lau and Williams [17]), using an ’overlapping design’ framework, in the sense
that all time horizons are compared with the same origin.12 We implemented this by
9See e.g. Rutstro¨m [37] or more recently Noussair, Robin and Ruffieux [30].
10For recent evidence on negative time discounting in an experiment with hypothetical questions see
Casari and Dragone [8].
11In spite of this element outside our control, treatments remained evenly balanced in terms of the sex
of the participants.
12Dohmen, Falk, Huffman and Sunde [11] study the effect of different design for the elicitation of time
preferences (with MPL elicitation) of overlapping (e.g. 0 to 6 months, 0 to 12 months) and shift (0 to 6
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presenting subjects with a screen with three buttons, each corresponding to one of the
time horizons.
Figure 1: Selecting a version
After completing each choice task, subjects were sent back to this screen with the
button corresponding to the time horizon already “played” appearing greyed out. In
addition to a fixed participation fee, 50% of the subjects in each group were drawn at
random to receive a payment consistent with their choices (we explain more precisely how
for each of the three methods below): at the end of the experiment we drew from a uniform
distribution which 8 subjects (out of 16 participants in each computerised session) would
receive a payment in addition to the show up fee; which screen (1 month, 2 months or 4
month delay) would ’count’, and, in the case of the MPL elicitation method, which row
in that screen (the payment corresponding to the option, A or B, chosen in that row)
would be selected for payment.
Subjects could enter money amounts in 50 eurocents increments. This has the advan-
tage of making possible mistakes more costly for subjects (see Harrison [16]), and since
we are not interested in the estimation of discount factors but only in the comparison
of alternative elicitation methods, having a coarse grid of elicited values is not an issue.
We have followed the current practice (see e.g. Filiz-Ozbay et al. [31]) not to indicate
the interest rates corresponding to each choice.13 Nevertheless, in the second part of the
months, 6 to 12 months) designs, and show that different designs do have an effect on the elicited values.
Though we use the overlapping design, we do this for all treatments, so that any differences we find
do not have to do with the specific design. An open question is whether a shift design would produce
different results.
13In a previous pilot, answers to the questionnaires following the elicitation phase show that the vast
majority of the participants did not know what the interest rate was on either checking or savings
accounts. Only 70 out of 376 respondents (i.e. 18.6%) stated that they had a current account. Of these
70, only 31 (just over a half) thought they knew the interest rate on their current account. As there were
indications of 7%, 8%, 10% and even 12% rates, while we found no current accounts paying more than 4%
on the market at the time, even if one were to take these rates as what subjects really thought they were
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experiment we test the subject awareness of the interest rates implied by their choices,
in order to obtain an approximate measure of how relevant these rates were for making
the decision. After all values have been elicited, subjects are asked to state the three
interest rates corresponding to their choices and referred to the specific time horizon. So,
for instance, a declaration of e18 in the two month horizon question would have an im-
plied rate of 10% for the month, with no need to report the interest implied on an annual
basis. These questions were incentivised, being remunerated at e2 or e1 depending on
whether the answer was within a 5% or 10% margin, respectively, of the true rate. Of
course the ability to provide a correct answer relies on memory, computational ability
and attention - we are not trying to test which of these aspects is more relevant. Only
17%, 12% and 9.8% come within 10% of the correct rate for one, two and four months
horizon, respectively. We report a full analysis of these errors in section 4 together with
our other results. Finally, we administered a simple questionnaire to elicit information on
personality traits, which we use mostly to verify the balancedness of our samples across
treatments in terms of these characteristics.
In summary, then, our experiment consisted of five phases for each of our three treat-
ments: 1) general instruction, 2) incentivised comprehension test (only the quickest 16
providing correct answers would continue to the next phase), 3) incentivised elicitation of
money discount factors (over three time horizons), 4) incentivised elicitation of perceived
interest rates (corresponding to the choices in the three time horizons), 5) HEXACO
questionnaire on personal characteristics.
2.1 MPL
We implemented the MPL elicitation method with a single switching point:14 the subject
is in essence asked to state the (minimum) value he is prepared to accept to avoid waiting
for the full amount L later. In other words, he prefers to receive any amount equal or
getting, it is pretty clear to us that their level of financial competence when it comes to interest rates is
less than expert (!). As for savings accounts, in the pilot about a third of subjects - 118 - declared they
had one. Of these, 49, i.e. around 40%, stated they knew what the interest rate they were getting was,
but 14 of these – i.e. almost 30% - stated a rate of at most 1%, and a further 16 stated rates between 1
and 2%: if this is really what they were getting, it was not a good deal!
14Andersen et al. [3] consider several alternative MPL implementations (depending on whether subjects
are allowed to express indifference, or state explicitly a switching point, or where, once a switching point
is identified, more questions are asked in order to narrow down further the range of discount factors) and
find no appreciable differences in the results, so that we take this as evidence that any of these methods
could be used.
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greater to the switching value s at an earlier date rather than receive L later. A sample
screenshot is reported in figure 2. Truth telling is a (weakly) dominant strategy (and
arguably the MPL elicitation method makes the optimality of truthtelling much easier for
participants to realise15 as compared to alternative methods). Appendix B explains this
point in detail for all three elicitation methods.
Figure 2: Sample Screenshot for MPL elicitation method
15Indeed, the convergence between ‘willingness to pay’ and ‘willingness to accept’ values elicited in Plott
and Zeiler [33]was obtained with a BDM mechanism. The implementation of the mechanism, though, is
very reminiscent of the multiple price list format: in practice they turn a matching task (the standard
BDM mechanism) into a choice task. See especially Plott and Zeiler [34], p. 8 and following.
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2.2 Auctions
We implemented a sealed-bid second-price auction to make it as similar as possible to the
setups in the other two elicitation methods. When auctioning a good, it is pretty clear
to participants that what they are offering is a price to obtain the good. In our case the
good in question is time: so subjects were asked to state the minimum amount they were
prepared to accept in order to anticipate receipt. This is arguably a direct way to frame
the problem which is easier for participants to understand, as compared to asking them
to state how much they would be prepared to pay in order to anticipate receipt, and then
work out by themselves how much money they would actually receive. The participant
stating the lowest amount would ‘win’ the auction and, if drawn, receive an amount equal
to the second lowest bid on the following day. A ‘loser’ would receive, if drawn, the full
amount with delay. A sample screenshot is visualised in figure 3.
Figure 3: Sample screenshot with the elicitation question for the auction method
The outcome of each auction was not revealed before the next auction was played, to
keep the three decision problems as independent as possible. At the end of the section, if
drawn, a winner of the auction received the second lowest amount the following day, while
a loser would receive the full amount with a delay of one, two or four months, depending
on the screen drawn.
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2.3 Becker-DeGroot-Marshack (BDM)
As in the Auction treatment, in our implementation of the BDM mechanism subjects
were are asked to state the minimum amount they would be prepared to accept in order
to anticipate receipt instead of waiting to receive the whole amount with delay. For each
of the three time horizons, if the value declared was not larger than a value drawn from
a uniform distribution with support up to L, then the subject would receive a payment
equal to the number drawn the following day. Otherwise he would get the full amount L
with delay. A sample screenshot is in figure 4.
Figure 4: Sample screenshot for the BDM elicitation method, two month version
3 Strategic equivalence
The observation that truthtelling is a weakly weakly optimal in all three treatments is not
sufficient to establish that the three elicitation methods are strategically equivalent, i.e.
that all three have the same strategy space, and in each the best reply correspondences
are identical. In this section we show this to be the case. For ease of exposition, we use
the term ‘declaration’ to refer to the smallest value of option A in the MPL elicitation,
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as well as the values declared in the Auction and BDM methods. We use the term ‘value
drawn’ to refer to the second highest declared value in the Auction method and the value
of Option A in the row drawn in the MPL method, as well as the value drawn in the BDM
method. The ‘small sooner’ amounts are paid with a delay of one day - nevertheless in
what follows we refer to ‘immediate’ payment or to payment ‘without delay’ to distinguish
it from the case when the payment is delayed by one, two or four months.
For all three methods the grid of available declarations was from e0.50 to e20.00 in
e0.50 increments; in all elicitation methods:
• the declaration determines whether payment is anticipated or not: it is anticipated
if the value drawn (row drawn for tables, number drawn for BDM, second lowest
bid for Auction) is higher than or equal to the declaration (smallest value of option
A for tables, number declared in Auction and BDM), and it is delayed if the value
drawn is smaller than the declaration.
• a declaration of e0.50 ensures the payment will not be delayed, though the payoff
may be as low as e0.50 (if such low value were drawn);
• a declaration of e20 ensures that the full payment will be received at the later date,
and with probability 1/40 (i.e. if e20 were drawn) the full amount could be received
without delay;
Next, we show that in each elicitation method declaring the true value is a weakly dom-
inant action, and establish the strategic equivalence of the three methods by displaying
a one-to-one correspondence between the strategy spaces and the payoffs of each of them
with those of the others.
The strategy space for agent i in method m = {M,B,A} (for MPL, BDM and second
price Auctions, respectively) is Smi = {0.50, 1, ...20} for all m. Let N denote ‘Nature’,
i.e. the random draw, which ‘plays’ in the BDM and Tables method, and let d denote
the value drawn. Assume rational agents with standard time preferences, so that for each
of them there exists a unique value s⇤i such that (s
⇤
i , 0) ⇠i (20, 1). The payoff to agent i
playing in treatment m is
piB (si, d) =
⇢
(d, 0) if si  d
(20, 1) if si > d
piM (si, d) =
⇢
(d, 0) if si  d
(20, 1) if si > d
piA (si, s−i) =
⇢
(d, 0) if si  d = min {sj : j 6= i}
(20, 1) if si > d = min {sj : j 6= i}
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so that the best reply correspondence Bm in treatment i is given by
BB (d) =
8<
:
{si : si  d} if s
⇤
i < d
{si : si  d} if s
⇤
i = d
{si : si > d} if s
⇤
i > d
= BM (d) = BA (s−i)
where as before in the case of auctions d = min {sj : j 6= i}.
4 Results
The bulk of our analysis revolves around what we term ’money discount factors’, calculated
simply by dividing the declared values s (smaller sooner) by the total delayed amount L,
that is as s
L
100.16
As already anticipated, we find that the methods do differ in terms of elicited values
(see Table 3). We can summarise our results as follows:
1. if we look at aggregate data, the three methods generate broadly different median
and mean money discount factors (Table 2): across treatments, the mean elicited
values are smallest for MPL and largest for BDM, with Auctions ‘in the middle’;
similarly for median elicited values, where however these coincide for MPL and BDM
for the two months and four months horizons. Broadly speaking, these differences
are statistically significant.
2. if we look at individual data, we see that in each treatment subjects can be classed
into three distinct groups, based on the values that they declare for each of the
three time horizons (Table 4). One group consists of subjects who declare (weakly)
smaller values as the time delay increases, in line with the standard exponential
discounting model. We call these subjects ‘Time is Money’ (TIM). A second group
displays the exactly opposite behaviour, declaring values that (weakly) increase as
the time to receipt of the full payment increases (TIP subjects, for ‘Time Is Plea-
sure’). A third group has non-monotonic declarations, with either a ‘hump’ or a
16The unit of measurement of 50 eurocents is also the inbuilt margin of error in the elicitation of the
true value. That is, we can assume that any amount elicited through these methods was within 0.5e of
the ‘true’ value s∗, which would lie within the range [s− 0.50, s]. Computing the money discount factors
as the ratios between the elicited values and the total amounts changes the range to
⇥
s−0.5
L
100, s
L
100
⇤
,
which 2.5% wide. Since the incentives are for subjects to state the highest possible values that they are
prepared to accept in order to avoid waiting, all the money discount factors we compute refer to the right
boundary of these ranges
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Auctions BDM MPL
Mean 16.39 16.83 14.77
One month Median 18 18 15
Mode 20 20 20
Mean 15.24 16.3 14.17
Two months Median 16.5 17.25 15
Mode 20 20 10
Mean 13.8 15.16 13.58
Four months Median 15 15 14.5
Mode 15 20 20
Table 2: Elicited values by treatment
‘bowl’ shape (henceforth HUBO), that is declared values that are either highest or
lowest for the two months horizon as compared to the one and four month horizons.
In addition, controlling for these time preference profiles, it emerges that the differ-
ences in elicited values across methods are driven mainly by the declarations of the
arguably more rational agents, the TIMs.
3. Subject whose declarations decrease with the time horizon (the ‘more rational’ sub-
jects) also appear to make fewer errors: when asked about the internal rate of return
corresponding to their choices, a larger proportion of TIMs assesses correctly the
discount rate corresponding to their declaration as compared to subjects with dif-
ferent time preference profiles. In addition, mistakes are smaller in absolute value.
Finally, TIP subjects tend to overestimate their errors as compared to TIMs
The rest of the section is devoted to analysing these results.
4.1 Time preference profiles and elicited money discount rates
We begin by reporting the descriptive statistics of the declared values in the three treat-
ments:
In addition, we report below the whole distributions of the elicited values by elicitation
method.
To investigate the statistical significance of the differences in distributions, we use the
following three tests: Wilcoxon-Mann-Withney (henceforth WMW) to test differences in
13
Figure 5: Distribution of elicited values by treatment
central location, assuming that the two distributions being compared have the same vari-
ance; Conover test to detect differences in variance between two distributions that does
not assume equality of either location or scale; and two sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
(henceforth KS), which is an omnibus test for the equality of two distributions against
the alternative that they are different (in either scale or location). The one sided KS test
detects when one distribution obtained with elicitation method X stochastically domi-
nates another distribution obtained with elicitation method Y. Thus we say that X-Y is
statistically significant as a shorthand for the observation that method X elicits values
which are consistently smaller than those elicited by method Y.
We find that the differences reported in Table 2 and Figure 5 are statistically significant
if we compare the MPL with any of the other two elicitation methods, the only exception
being the difference between Auctions and MPL in the four month horizon. Whenever
the differences are statistically significant, both Auctions and BDM elicit consistently
lower declarations than the MPL method (see Tables 15 and 14in the Appendix), with
the distribution of values elicited in the MPL method dominated stochastically by those
with both of the other methods.
When comparing Auctions and BDM the differences are less pronounced, in the sense
that we cannot detect differences in central location assuming that the distributions have
14
Auctions vs. BDM BDM vs. MPL Auctions vs. MPL
location One month o *** **
Two Months o *** *
Four Months * * o
variance One month ** *** *
Two Months *** *** o
Four Months o *** o
general One month o **(MPL-BDM) **(MPL-Auction)
(one sided) Two Months o ** (MPL-BDM) *(MPL-Auctions)
Four Months *(Auctions-MPL) o o
Legend (significance value) ***: 1%, **: 5%, *: 10%,
o: statistics p-value is greater than 10%
Table 3: Summary of differences between distributions of elicited values
the same variance. However for more general differences in distributions we do find differ-
ences that are statistically significant for the shorter time horizons.17 These observations
are summarised in Table 3.
4.2 Individual level data
Aggregate data hide a great degree of variability. Recall that the questions being asked
were of the form “I prefer to obtain X tomorrow rather than e20 with delay”, where the
delay changed across questions (one month, two months, four months). Consequently,
the higher the declared value, the less the agent is sensitive to time as compared to the
monetary amount to be received. TIMs choices are compatible with those of standard
rational agents, as these decision makers give up (weakly) more in order to anticipate
receipt of the prize as the delay increases. The majority of subjects fall into this category,
which also included those who declared the maximum amount (e20) regardless of the
time horizon. TIPs make about a quarter of the subjects and they seem to mirror TIMs,
as they are prepared to give up less the longer the delay - the proportion of such agents is
highest in the case of Auctions. Finally HUBOs make up the non-negligible proportion of
17More precisely, if we look at the comparison between Auctions and BDM, a Conover test shows
that the two distributions of elicited values are different at the 5% level for one and two months time
horizons (p values are 0.0275, 0.0045 and 0.147 for one, two and four month horizons, respectively).
For longest time horizon we see that Auctions elicit statistically smaller values than BDM (two sample
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test has a p-value of 0.0675). See Table 13 for details.
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Count Treatment %
Auctions HUBO 8 12.5%
TIM 39 60.9%
TIP 17 26.6%
BDM HUBO 8 12.5%
TIM 41 64.1%
TIP 15 23.4%
MPL HUBO 13 20.3%
TIM 36 56.3%
TIP 15 23.4%
Table 4: Preference profiles by treatment
Time invariant preferences
Count Treatment %
Auctions
20 6 54.5%
<20 5 45.5%
BDM
20 12 66.7%
<20 6 33.3%
MPL
20 8 66.7%
<20 4 33.3%
Table 5: Time invariant preference by treatment
subjects who exhibit non monotonic time preferences (either in “hump” or “bowl” form),
which we are unable to rationalise within any of the existing models. Interestingly, this
percentage is substantially larger in the MPL (23.4% of participants) elicitation method
- which one might have thought of as more intuitive - than in the BDM or Auction (both
12.5%).
In addition, some agents show constant time preference profiles, i.e. they make the
same declaration regardless of the time horizon. Of these, more than half (26 out of
41 subjects) always declare a value of 20, which is compatible with a unitary discount
factor, and for this reason we group them together with the other ‘rational’ TIM agents.
Those whose elicited values do not vary with the time horizon but are smaller than 20 are
grouped together with the TIPs, as they fit the definition of weakly decreasing declared
values (with a large fall for the first time horizon, which then remains constant). Their
distribution by treatment is recorded in Table 5.
Controlling by time preference profiles (Table 6) shows that aggregation hides a sub-
stantial variability in the data, in the sense that the differences which are statistically
16
significant are driven by the subgroup of ‘rational’ TIMs.
For TIMs the ordering of elicited values from smaller to larger is MPL<AuctionsBDM
for all time horizons when looking at median and modal values. For mean values, the order
between BDM and Auctions is reversed for the shortest horizon, revealing a distribution
more skewed towards the origin in the case of Auctions, which appears more dispersed. If
we look at each treatment separately, it is interesting to note that the differences between
the values elicited for TIP and HUBO subjects are largest with the MPL method, and
smallest with the BDM, while the Auction sits somewhere in the middle, irrespective of
time horizon.
We report the statistics for the non monotonic participants, too, simply for information
– unsurprisingly, no clear pattern emerges there; for this reason, we omit them from the
subsequent analysis.
As for the other two groups, inspection of Tables 13-15 (appendix) reveals the follow-
ing:
• Auction-BDM comparison: for TIM agents, the two distributions differ in location
(significant at 10% for four months), variance (significant at 1% and 5%, respectively
for one and two month horizons, and at 10% for four month horizon), and distri-
bution (Auctions stochastically dominate BDM at 10% significance for the longest
time horizon) while no statistical significance at the conventional level is detected
for TIP subjects (see summary in Table 7);
• BDM-MPL: the two distribution differ in variance for TIM subjects but not for the
TIPs; differences in location and other general differences that we saw for aggregate
data appear to obtain as the combination of disaggregated differences that emerge
within each of the two subpopulations for different time horizons (see summary in
Table 8)
• Auctions-MPL: while there is no statistical difference in the variance for the two
distributions of elicited values under Auctions and MPL for TIP subjects, the differ-
ence is statistically significant for TIMs except for the two month horizon (where the
p-value is 0.11). The median differs statistically across treatment for both groups of
subjects for the shortest time horizon, but only for TIMs for the two month horizon,
and the distribution under MPL stochastically dominates the one under Auctions
for both TIPs and TIMs with a one month horizon, but only for the TIMs in the
case of two month horizon (see summary in Table 9).
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One month delay
Mean Median Mode
TIM
Auctions 18.19 19.50 20.00
BDM 17.87 20.00 20.00
MPL 17.07 17.50 20.00
TIP
Auctions 13.47 15.00 15.00
BDM 14.43 15.00 15.00
MPL 10.30 10.00 10.00
HUBO
Auctions 13.81 13.25 9.00
BDM 16.00 15.50 15.00
MPL 13.58 15.00 15.00
Two month delay
Mean Median Mode
TIM
Auctions 15.88 18.00 20.00
BDM 16.72 18.00 20.00
MPL 14.60 15.00 20.00
TIP
Auctions 14.32 15.00 7.00
BDM 15.90 17.00 19.00
MPL 14.00 14.50 10.00
HUBO
Auctions 14.06 15.00 15.00
BDM 14.94 14.50 14.00
MPL 13.19 13.00 17.00
Four month delay
Mean Median Mode
TIM
Auctions 12.96 15.00 15.00
BDM 14.59 15.00 20.00
MPL 12.04 10.25 10.00
TIP
Auctions 16.03 15.00 20.00
BDM 16.40 19.00 20.00
MPL 15.90 17.00 20.00
HUBO
Auctions 13.13 14.00 6.00
BDM 15.75 16.50 10.00
MPL 15.15 15.00 15.00
Table 6: Central location of elicited values by treatment and time preference profile
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Auctions vs. BDM
TIMs TIPs
location One month o o
Two Months o o
Four Months * o
variance One month *** o
Two Months ** o
Four Months o o
general One month o o
(one sided) Two Months o o
Four Months *(Auctions-MPL) o
Legend (significance value) ***: 1%, **: 5%, *: 10%,
o: statistics p-value is greater than 10%
Table 7: Summary of differences between distributions of elicited values
Summing up, then, it appears that subjects whose money discount rates have a more
standard behaviour, in that they fall as the time horizon increases, are more sensitive
to the framing of the elicitation method that subject with less standard time preference
profiles. This is all the more puzzling if we consider that TIMs also seem to be more
’on the ball’ than TIPs when it comes to awareness of the interest rates corresponding to
their declaration, as we explain in the next section.
Auctions vs MPL
TIMs TIPs
location One month * **
Two Months * o
Four Months o o
variance One month *** o
Two Months o o
Four Months * o
general One month **(MPL-Auctions) **(MPL-Auctions)
(one sided) Two Months *(MPL-Auctions) o
Four Months o o
Legend (significance value) ***: 1%, **: 5%, *: 10%,
o: statistics p-value is greater than 10%
Table 9: Summary of differences between distributions of elicited values
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BDM vs MPL
TIMs TIPs
location One month o ***
Two Months ** **
Four Months ** o
variance One month ** o
Two Months *** o
Four Months ** o
general One month o ***(MPL-BDM)
(one sided) Two Months *(MPL-BDM) o
Four Months **(MPL-BDM) o
Legend (significance value) ***: 1%, **: 5%, *: 10%,
o: statistics p-value is greater than 10%
Table 8: Summary of differences between distributions of elicited values
4.3 Errors
As anticipated, after eliciting the money discount rates, in the last phase of the experiment
we verified (in an incentive compatible way) how aware subjects were of the interest rates
implied by their choices. In a nutshell, we find that TIMs make errors which are in
absolute value closer to zero than TIPs, and that the latter tend to overestimate the
rates corresponding to their choices (i.e. they are biased in one direction). Interestingly,
the elicitation method seems to have no effect on mistakes. Let us consider these points
in more detail.
We begin by showing the frequency of mistakes by time horizon, reported in Table 10
What is immediately evident is that many more TIMs than TIPs guess their implied
rates correctly (for responding TIMs guesses within 10% are roughly 28%, 21% and 13%
for one, two and four month horizons, while for TIPs we have 13%, 8% and 15%, re-
spectively), though for TIMs mistakes increase with the time horizon. For both TIMs
and TIPs most of the correct guesses are within 5% of the true implied rates, and non
respondents are roughly 17% for both groups.
Are these differences statistically significant? A Fisher test distinguishing between
those guessing within 10% or less of the rate corresponding to their choices and those who
guessed outside this interval finds significant differences over one and two month horizons,
but not over four month horizons. If instead we look at the absolute difference in rates (i.e.
regardless of whether the mistake under or over estimates the actual rate corresponding to
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Profile of time preferences
Hump-Bowl Time Is Money Time Is Pleasure
One month Don’t know 6 20 8
Error >10% 22 69 34
5%<Error10 % 0 1 1
Error 5% 1 26 4
Two months Don’t know 8 20 9
Error >10% 21 76 35
5%<Error10 % 0 2 1
Error 5% 0 18 2
Four months Don’t know 7 19 7
Error >10% 22 84 34
5%<Error10 % 0 1 1
Error 5% 0 12 5
Table 10: Frequency of mistakes by time horizon
the choice), differences between TIM and TIP subjects are always statistically significant,
although while for short time horizons TIPs make larger mistakes, it is TIMs who make
larger mistakes for the four month horizon. However there may be a confounding effect: by
definition, TIMs are those subjects for whom declared values decrease with time horizon,
whereas the opposite is true for TIPs. So if errors grow with the distance from the
undiscounted sum, one would find spurious differences due to the size of the errors, not
to other specific cognitive biases.
To address this point we look at the whole series of differences/correct answers, without
distinguishing by time horizon. Indeed in this case we find significant differences, as follows
(where of course we are excluding subjects who did not provide an answer for the rates):
1. A Fisher exact test18 shows association between type of agent (TIMs vs TIPs) and
‘propensity’ to make mistakes;
2. When looking at signed differences between actual and declared rates, this difference
is significant at 10% with WMW19 and at 1% for KS (which does not assume that
18The two sided p-value for a Fisher test of the independence of the errors (within or without 10% of
true value) in the two populations of TIMs and TIPs (Table 11) has a two sided exact p-value of 0.0238.
The one sided exact p-value testing independence against the alternative that the proportion of correct
guesses is larger for TIMs than for TIPs is 0.0127.
19The Wilcoxon-Mann-Withney rejects the null that the two distributions come from the same pop-
ulation against the one sided alternative that errors are larger for TIPs at 10% confidence level (exact
p-value 0.0977).
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the distributions are the same), and shows that the distribution for TIPs first order
stochastically dominates20 the one for TIMs: that is, TIPs tend to overestimate the
rates (the formula for the errors is “true rate – declared rate”);
3. When looking at absolute differences, both WMW21 and KS22 show a significant
difference between the two populations of agents; now it is the TIMs who first order
stochastically dominate the TIPs, i.e. TIMs make errors which are closer to zero
than TIPs.
Below we look at these three last points more in detail. First of all, consider the distri-
bution of guesses within 10% of the correct from Table 11.
TIMs TIPs Total
More than 10% error 229 103 332
away from correct rate (79.24%) (88.03%)
Within 10% 60 14 74
of correct rate (20.76%) (11.97%)
Total 289 117 406
Table 11: Frequency of mistakes by preference profiles regardless of time horizon
This table shows that there are almost twice as many rational subjects who get within
10% of the correct guess (in proportion) as compared to TIPs. These differences are
statistically significant: the one sided Fisher’s exact test rejects the null hypothesis of
equality of success rates against the alternative that the success rate is higher in the TIM
population as compared to the TIPs. If we then look at the differences and absolute
differences between correct and guessed rates, we find that TIPs tend to overestimate the
rates as compared to rational subjects, and also to make larger mistakes (see Figures 6a
and 6b).
20The Kolmogorov Smirnov test comparing the differences between actual and declared rates in the
two populations of TIMs and TIPs rejects the null against the one sided alternative that errors by TIPS
first order stochastically dominate errors by TIMs has an exact p-value of 0.006.
21The Wilcoxon-Mann-Withney rejects the null that the two distributions come from the same popula-
tion against the one sided alternative that errors are in absolute value larger for TIPs at 10% confidence
level (exact p-value 0.0006).
22The Kolmogorov Smirnov test comparing the differences between actual and declared rates in the
two populations of TIMs and TIPs rejects the null against the one sided alternative that the absolute
size of errors by TIMs first order stochastically dominate errors by TIPs has an exact p-value of 0.00186.
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(a) Signed rate estimation error (b) Absolute rate estimation errors
Figure 6: Distributions of the rate estimation error
pothesis of equal distribution in favour of the alternative hypothesis that the distribution
of errors for TIPs first order stochastically dominates the one for TIMs: that is, TIP sub-
jects’ errors are more concentrated on larger negative values than those of TIM subjects,
indicating that TIPs tend to overestimate the effective rates. If we then turn to consider
the absolute size of the mistakes to abstract from over or under estimation of the errors,
a KS test rejects the null hypothesis of equality in favour of an alternative where now it
is the distribution of errors for TIMs that first order stochastically dominates the one for
TIPs: that is, TIMs tend to make smaller errors, regardless of sign, as compared to TIPs.
Finally, observe how these differences change across treatments:
Auctions BDM MPL
Time is Money outside 10% 69 (71.9%) 79 (84.1%) 81 (81.8%)
within 10% 27 (28.1%) 15 (15.9%) 18 (18.2%)
Time is Pleasure outside 10% 27 (70.1%) 40 (95.3%) 36 (93.3%)
within 10% 11 (29.9%) 2 (4.7%) 1 (2.7%)
Table 12: Subjects and errors by treatment
TIMs and TIPs have similar error rates in the Auction elicitation method, varying
substantially with the other two elicitation methods. The comparison between BDM and
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Auctions is particularly interesting, as these were the closest methods in terms of visual
layout.
5 Concluding remarks
The general conclusion we draw from the experimental results is that in ‘competitive’
situations (either against Nature, as in the BDM mechanism, or against other human
players, as in an auction), subjects behave differently than when compiling a table, al-
though decision-theoretically all situations are equivalent.23 This is worrisome for the
external validity of standard elicitation methods, since competitive situations are at least
as common in real life as non competitive ones.
Drilling into our results further, we have categorised subjects into three main groups
based on the time monotonicity of the elicited values, and found that the proportion of
subjects displaying non-standard choice behaviour is non-negligible. Interestingly, the
differences across treatments appear to be driven by the choices of the ‘TIM’ subjects,
i.e. those who, in accordance to the standard time preference framework, are prepared to
pay more to speed-up receipt of a prize the longer the delay. Why could this be? Our
experiment is exploratory in nature, and was not designed to test specific explanations
for the (unanticipated) observed results. However, we note that they are compatible with
the assumption that decision makers not relying on heuristics are more easily influenced
by a change in the framing of the problem. As explained at length in the paper, the
three elicitation methods have been constructed to make them equivalent and to provide
the same incentives both on and off the optimal behaviour, so that any differences in
observed behaviour can only be down to the payoff irrelevant presentation of the questions.
It is conceivable that a decision maker relying on heuristics will be less prone to being
influenced by the frame. Compatible with this line of reasoning is the fact that ‘TIP’
subjects (i.e. those who appear to like delays) do make larger errors in assessing their
choices ex post: whether or not wrong-guessing the rate of return implied by each choice is
down to imperfect recall, lack of attention or low computational abilities (or to something
else), a decision maker relying on simple heuristics may be less likely to base his choices
on rate of returns.
Perhaps contrary to expectations, subjects are more impatient in non-competitive
situations (see table 6), regardless of time preference profile. However, these results can
23Interestingly, for the BDM procedure, Ariely et al. [1] find differences in elicited values when varying
the shape of the distribution from which the random values are drawn.
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also be couched in the context of differences between choice and matching tasks. As
discussed in the introduction, such differences have been uncovered in various domains:24
possible explanations go from emotional distress25 to the fact that, when attributes of
the objects being evaluated are clearly recognizable, choice tasks attribute more weight
to the more important attributes that do matching task (prominence effect).26 Note,
though, that these are all within-subject designs, i.e. the same subject is confronted with
both choice and matching tasks. Once the connection between the two is made less clear,
the choice-matching discrepancy should disappear, as shown in e.g. Fischer et al [12].
Thus with a between-subject design like the one we have employed, one should expect
to observe no significant differences across elicitation method (provided, of course, that
the subject in each treatment have been drawn from the same subject pool). Moreover,
our finding is in the context of incentive compatible, real reward choices, not hypothetical
ones. Yet we do find these differences, which leaves wide open the question of why they
occur.27
Since the estimation of discount factors depends on the reliability of the time preference
elicitation method, we hope that our contribution will open up further lines of research
in the investigation of the relative merits of elicitation techniques other than the (so far
most widely used) multiple price list format.
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Appendices
A Instructions
The translation of the original instructions (in Italian) follows below (we omit the compre-
hension test for space reasons - it showed three screens, one for each time horizon, as filled
by an hypothetical participants. On each screen two simple questions asked about what
payment would the hypothetical participant received if drawn or not drawn. Screenshots
are available here.
A.1 Sheet 1 (common to all treatments)
This experiment studies choice over time. Please read carefully the instructions that
follow while an assistant also reads them aloud. You will be given a fixed participation
fee at the end of the experiment. Moreover you may be able to receive an additional sum
on top of the participation fee. This additional amount will depend on your choices and
on a random draw. More precisely, you will have one chance in two to be drawn to receive
the additional payment.
At the end of the experiment we will ask you to complete a questionnaire. The
information collected will be used solely for research purposes. The information collected
will be kept completely anonymously.
Click ‘NEXT’ to continue.
A.2 Sheet 2
A.2.1 - MPL
TAKING PART IN THE EXPERIMENT
By participating in this experiment you have one chance in two of being drawn to
receive a monetary amount. We will ask you shortly to make some choices between
monetary rewards payable at different points in time. All the choices, presented in a
table, are between two options: option “A” or option “B”. Each option consists of an
amount of money which you could receive, and each row in the table corresponds to a
different pair A and B For each row you will have to choose between a smaller amount
payable tomorrow (option A) or a larger amount payable later (option B) Option B is the
same in all rows, and corresponds to the receipt of e20, payable with some weeks delay.
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Option A instead is different on all rows, and varies between a minimum of e0.50 and a
maximum of e20. Careful! You must make a choice in each row. To do so you will have
to use the cursor in the middle of the screen: you can scroll it using the mouse to select
the option that you prefer in each row. You will see three tables in total, differing from
one another only for the delay with which the e20 of option B are payable.
Three random draws will take place at the end of the experiment. The first will
draw one of the three screens, the second will draw one of the forty rows from that
screen, and the third will draw the participants which will receive the additional payment,
corresponding to the choice made in the row drawn. This means that if you are drawn
to receive a payment, the amount of money you will receive will be that corresponding to
the option (A or B) that you chose in the row drawn. This means that each choice you
will make in each of the three tables may be rewarded.
Click ‘NEXT’ to continue
A.2.2 Auctions
TAKING PART IN THE EXPERIMENT
By participating in this experiment you have one chance in two of being drawn to
receive e20, which will be payable with a delay of some weeks. However you will have
the opportunity to anticipate receipt to tomorrow. In this case you will have to give up
part of the total amount. Very shortly you will see a screen where you will be able to
take part in an auction to anticipate the payment to tomorrow. As the other participants,
you will have to declare the minimum amount you are prepared to receive in place of the
full e20 to receive your payment tomorrow, entering a value between e0.50 and e20 in
e0.50 steps. The participant declaring the lowest value will acquire the right to receive
the payment earlier. If two or more participants have inserted the same minimum value,
all of these participants will acquire the right to receive the payment earlier.
How much is the early payment?
If you are drawn for payment:
1) if your declared value is the smallest, you will be entitled to receive tomorrow an
amount of money equal to the lowest of all the other declarations excluding yours. Thus
in case of a draw with one or more participants, such lowest value will be the same as the
one you declared.
2) if your declared value is not the smallest, you will be entitled to the full e20 but
with delay.
Suppose for instance that there are only two participants, Jane who declares ex and
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John who declares ey, and suppose that they are both drawn to receive payment. If ex
is smaller than ey, Jane gets the right to early payment, and will receive ey tomorrow,
while John will receive e20 with delay; if ex is larger than ey, Jane will receive e20 with
delay while John gets the right to early payment, and will receive ex tomorrow; if ex
and ey are the same, then both Jane and John will receive ex=ey tomorrow.
How much to declare?
If you think about it, you will see that the best option for you is to declare the amount
that makes you indifferent between receiving such amount tomorrow or the whole e20
with delay. Consider for instance the two extreme values, namely e0.50 and e20. If
you declare e0.50, you will be sure that, if drawn for payment, you will receive your
payment tomorrow, but you could earn as little as e0.50 in case another participant has
also declared e0.50. If you declare e20 you will be sure that, if drawn, you will receive
the whole e20 albeit with delay: the exception is if everybody else has also declared e20,
in which case everybody will have the right to early payment. Yet even in this case if
the declaration which makes you indifferent is less than e20, by declaring such value you
would be the only participant to get the right for early payment, and would receive e20
tomorrow anyway.
You will be shown three screens in total, which differ only for the delay with which
the full e20 are payable.
Two random draws will take place at the end of the experiment. The first will draw
one of the three screens, the second will draw the participants who will receive a payment
corresponding to the choices made. This means that if you are drawn to receive a payment,
the amount of money you will receive will be based on the choice you made in the screen
drawn. This means that each choice you will make in each of the three screens may be
rewarded.
Click ‘NEXT’ to continue
A.2.3 BDM
TAKING PART IN THE EXPERIMENT
By participating in this experiment you have one chance in two of being drawn to
receive e20, which will be payable with a delay of some weeks. However you will have the
opportunity to anticipate receipt to tomorrow. In this case you will have to give up part
of the total amount. Very shortly you will see a screen where you will be able to declare
the minimum amount you are prepared to receive in place of the full e20 to receive your
payment tomorrow, entering a value between e0.50 and e20 in e0.50 steps. After your
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choice a number between e0.50 and e20 in e0.50 increments will be drawn at random.
Every value between e0.50 and e20 in e0.50 increments has the same probability of being
drawn
How much is the early payment?
If you are drawn for payment:
1) if your declared value smaller or equal to the one drawn, you will be entitled to
receive tomorrow an amount of money equal to the number drawn.
2) if your declared value is larger than the one drawn, you will be entitled to the full
e20 but with delay.
How much to declare?
If you think about it, you will see that the best option for you is to declare the amount
that makes you indifferent between receiving such amount tomorrow or the whole e20
with delay. Consider for instance the two extreme values, namely e0.50 and e20. If you
declare e0.50, you will be sure that, if drawn for payment, you will receive your payment
tomorrow, but you could earn as little as e0.50 in case the number drawn is e0.50. If
you declare e20 you will be sure that, if drawn for payment, you will receive the whole
e20 albeit with delay: the exception is if e20 is drawn, in which you would receive e20
tomorrow. Yet even in this case if the declaration which makes you indifferent is less than
e20, by declaring such value you would receive e20 tomorrow anyway.
You will be shown three screens in total, which differ only for the delay with which
the full e20 are payable.
Three random draws will take place at the end of the experiment. The first will
draw one of the three screens, the second will draw a number between e0.50 and e20 in
e0.50 increments, and the third will draw the participants who will receive a payment
corresponding to the choices made. This means that if you are drawn to receive a payment,
the amount of money you will receive will be based on the choice you made in the screen
drawn. This means that each choice you will make in each of the three screens may be
rewarded.
Click ‘NEXT’ to continue
A.3 Sheet 3
A.3.1 MPL
INTEREST RATE PHASE
In the next screen you will have the possibility, if drawn, to earn additional money.
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In each of the previous screens your choices have determined the last line (counting
from the top) in which you have chosen option A over option B. On that row of course
the value of option A would have been between e20 (if you chose option A only on the
first line, the one at the top) and e0.50 (if you chose option A always, down to the
bottom line). In the next screen we will ask you to enter the simple annual interest rate
corresponding to the choice you made in the last line where you chose option A, in each
of the three tables.
If drawn, your earnings will be determined as follows:
1. if the simple annual interest rate you entered for the table drawn is within ±5% of
the simple annual interest rate corresponding to your choice, you will earn e2;
2. if the simple annual interest rate you entered for the table drawn differs more than
±5% but not more than ±10% from the simple annual interest rate corresponding
to your choice, you will earn e1;
3. for larger differences, or if you do not enter any value, you will earn nothing.
Click on ‘NEXT’ to continue
A.4 Auctions and BDM
INTEREST RATE PHASE
In the next screen you will have the possibility, if drawn, to earn additional money.
We will ask you to enter the three simple annual interest rates corresponding to the
choices you made in the three preceding screens.
If drawn, your earnings will be determined as follows:
1. if the simple annual interest rate you entered for the version drawn is within ±5%
of the simple annual interest rate corresponding to your choice, you will earn e2;
2. if the simple annual interest rate you entered for the version drawn differs more than
±5% but not more than ±10% from the simple annual interest rate corresponding
to your choice, you will earn e1;
3. for larger differences, or if you do not enter any value, you will earn nothing.
Click on ‘NEXT’ to continue
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B Truth-telling elicitation
B.1 MPL
Figure 7: Truthtelling payoff in the MPL method
Let s⇤ be the ‘true’ switching value, i.e.
the value that makes the agent indif-
ferent between receiving s⇤ earlier (op-
tion A) and waiting for the full amount
(option B). A standard rational agent
would choose option A in all those rows
in which option A pays an amount s
such that s > s⇤, and option B in all
other rows. Number all the rows in the
table progressively by the value s which
in optionA in that particular row, iden-
tifying the ‘switching row’ s⇤ as the one
such that the subject would chooses op-
tion A in all rows with s > s⇤, and option B in all other rows such that s < s⇤.
Figure 8: Payoffs in case of deviation from truthtelling, MPL
s⇤, then (having chosen option A in all such rows) the subject will receive the drawn
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amount s sooner. If instead the s is less than s⇤, the agent will receive the option B.
At the switching row, being indifferent the decision maker could state either option A or
option B, as they are payoff equivalent. The payoff in case of truthtelling is depicted in
figure 7. Based on this, it is easy to construct payoffs in case of deviations, depicted in
figure 13: by deviating to a lower switching value s0 the agent risks ending up with a lower
payoff in case a row where values in option A falling in the interval [s0, s⇤) is drawn; and
similarly, deviating to a higher switching point s00 again the agent risks ending up with a
(dispreferred) option B in case a row falling in the interval (s⇤, s00] is drawn (Figure 8).
B.2 Second price Auctions
Figure 9: Truthtelling payoff, Auctions
In a second price auction truthful rev-
elation of one’s (perceived) true valua-
tion is a weakly dominant strategy. A
strategy for the subject consists in stat-
ing an amount s.
Under truthful revelation, the sub-
ject declares the amount s⇤ that makes
him indifferent between receiving s⇤
sooner (denote this option by (s⇤, 0))
and the full amount L later (which
we denote by (L, 1)). The payoff in
case of truthtelling is depicted in fig-
ure 9, where on the horizontal axis
we measure the minimum bid made by
the competitors, and on the vertical
axis the payoff accruing to the decision
maker playing the auction. If prefer-
ences are summarised by a utility function, the payoff derived form the two indifferent
outcomes (s⇤, 0) and (L, 1) should yield the same utility, i.e. u (s⇤, 0) = u (L, 1). In fig-
ure 9 the light dashed grey line represents the decision maker’s utility for money under
truthful revelation. Consider the case when the agent bids his true valuation s⇤. If the
minimum bid is below s⇤, the agent is going to lose the auction, and receive the full
amount L with delay, represented by the flat portion of his utility function in figure 9.
If instead the minimum bid is at or above s⇤, then the agent is going to win the auction
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and receive that second bid amount earlier, explaining the increasing portion of his utility
function to the right of s⇤. Note that in case of a tie the second lowest bid coincides with
s⇤.
Figure 10: Payoffs in case of deviation from truthtelling, Auctions
on the left, the solid black locus depicts the payoff in case of overstating one’s true value,
whereas the payoff when understating the true value is represented by the solid black
locus on the right hand side.
B.3 BDM
For a standard agent endowed with a utility function for money, incentives are as in the
auctions, as depicted in figure 11, where again the horizontal axis measures monetary
amounts. Payoffs now depend not on the minimum bid, but on the number drawn. As
before, utility for money is represented by the dashed light grey line, while the solid black
line represents the payoff in case of truthtelling when the BDM mechanism is applied. If
an individual states truthfully the amount s⇤ that solves u (s⇤, 0) = u (L, 1), then for any
number drawn which is smaller than or equal to s⇤, the decision maker will receive the
full amount L with delay, while if the number drawn is greater than s⇤, then the subject
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receives an amount equal to the number drawn sooner, so that his payoff now follows the
dashed line.
To show that there are no incentives to deviate from truthtelling, consider the panels
in figure 8, where on the left we consider deviations to s0 < s⇤, and on the right to s0 > s⇤.
In the left panel, while nothing changes if the number drawn, d, is smaller than s0 or at
least as large as s⇤, if d 2 [s0, s⇤) then the agent is going to receive that monetary amount
immediately, yielding a lower utility than that corresponding to declaring s⇤. A deviation
to a larger amount s00 > s⇤ is also non profitable, since as before the payoff does not
change if either d > s00 or d  s⇤, while if d 2 [s⇤, s00) then payment is going to be delayed,
yielding utility u (L, 1) = u (s⇤, 0) < u (d, 0).
Figure 11: Truthtelling payoff, BDM
C Test statistics
In this appendix we report our test statistics. All tests have been carried out with StatX-
act. Unless specified, all tests are exact. The tests we consider are the following:
• Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests (assumes same distribution)
• Hodges-Lehman test estimate of the WMW shift.
• Conover test: makes no assumption on the location parameter or variance being the
same in the two populations
38
• Two sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test: is a general test for the difference of two
distributions, considering differences of any kind, including location and dispersion.
It is not very powerful against tests which consider specific alternatives (e.g. shift
in distribution), unless a one sided alternative can be specified. In the case of a
one sided test, the column Fi-Fj reports the p-values corresponding to the alterna-
tive hypothesis that distribution i is stochastically smaller than distribution j, or
equivalently that sample i will tend to produce smaller values than sample j.
C.1 Comparing distributions of elicited values
Tables 13-15 below report p-values of the various statistics; these are highlighted in dark
grey if smaller than 5%, and in light gray if between 5% and 10% .
WMWo Hodges-Lehman
Auctions-BDM 95% CI
All One month 0.3365 0 [-1, 0.5]
Two months 0.1257 0 [-2, 0]
Four months 0.05695 -1 [-3, 0]
TIM One month 0.4727 0 [0, 0]
Two months 0.2454 0 [-2, 0]
Four months 0.08897 -1.5 [-4, 0]
TIP One month 0.3427 0 [-4.5, 2]
Two months 0.1049 -1.5 [-5, 1]
Four months 0.3129 0 [-4, 1]
Legend: o (one sided)
Conovero Two sample KS (Auctions= 1)
|F1− F2| F1− F2 F2− F1
All One month 0.0275M 0.8999 0.5136 0.7228
Two months 0.0045M 0.5492 0.2802 1
Four months 0.147M 0.1349 0.0675 0.9259
TIM One month 0.001751 0.6806 0.6913 0.352
Two months 0.04082 0.5683 0.2955 0.5644
Four months 0.2391 0.1908 0.09766 0.9327
TIP One month 0.147 0.7069 0.3826 0.6393
Two months 0.2483 0.3628 0.1838 0.8372
Four months 0.4458 0.7471 0.3849 0.795
Legend: M exact using Montecarlo; o (one sided)
Table 13: Elicited values in Auctions vs BDM by time preference profiles
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WMWo Hodges-Lehman
BDM-MPL 95% CI
All One month 0.004397 2 [0, 3]
Two months 0.003695 2 [0, 4]
Four months 0.05738 1 [0, 3.5]
TIM One month 0.1146 0 [0, 2]
Two months 0.02083 1 [0, 4]
Four months 0.02973 2 [0, 5]
TIP One month 0.002339 5 [2, 6.5]
Two months 0.05273 2.5 [0, 5]
Four months 0.2682 0 [-1.5, 4]
Legend: o (one sided)
Conovero Two sample KS (BDM= 1)
|F1− F2| F1− F2 F2− F1
All One month 0.0015M 0.03633 1 0.01817
Two months 0.0016M 0.05617 1 0.02808
Four months 0.0775M 0.4082 1 0.2054
TIM One month 0.02597 0.4016 0.8589 0.2047
Two months 0.008945 0.1151 1.0000 0.06229
Four months 0.01334 0.05427 1.0000 0.02603
TIP One month 0.3878 0.00536 1.0000 0.00268
Two months 0.4162 0.302 0.8585 0.1513
Four months 0.433 0.5354 0.8294 0.2715
Legend: M exact using Montecarlo; o (one sided)
Table 14: Elicited values in BDM vs MPL by time preference profiles
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WMWo Hodges-Lehman
Auctions-MPL 95% CI
All One month 0.01947 1.5 [0, 3]
Two months 0.07236 1 [0, 3]
Four months 0.4217 0 [-1.5, 2]
TIM One month 0.07756 0 [0, 2.5]
Two months 0.098 1 [0, 3.5]
Four months 0.2014 1 [-2, 4]
TIP One month 0.01664 3.5 [0, 6.5]
Two months 0.3503 0 [-3, 3.5]
Four months 0.4809 0 [-2.5, 3]
Legend: o (one sided)
Conovero Two sample KS (Auctions= 1)
|F1− F2| F1− F2 F2− F1
All One month 0.0636M 0.02278 1 0.01139
Two months 0.328M 0.1428 0.8516 0.0714
Four months 0.1463M 0.5464 0.6595 0.2793
TIM One month 0.001038 0.05656 1.0000 0.03065
Two months 0.1173 0.1497 0.7925 0.07677
Four months 0.09335 0.2618 0.5265 0.1319
TIP One month 0.1051 0.03361 1.0000 0.01413
Two months 0.2537 0.9243 0.6303 0.5298
Four months 0.2927 0.9958 0.7007 0.6619
Legend: M exact using Montecarlo; o (one sided)
Table 15: Elicited values in Auctions vs MPL by time preference profiles
C.2 Errors
Tables 16-20 report the test results summarised in section 4.3 in the main text.
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Fisher’s exact test
TIM TIP one sided two sided
One month
ok 27 5 One month 0.0434 0.07421
wrong 69 34 Two months 0.0568 0.08119
Two months
ok 20 3 Four months 0.499 0.7908
wrong 76 34
Four months
ok 13 6
wrong 84 34
Table 16: correct (within 10%) vs non correct (more than 10%) rate predictions, TIMs
versus TIPs
WMWo
Hodges-Lehman Two sample KS (TIM= 1)
TIM-TIP 95% CI |F1− F2| F1− F2 F2− F1
All One month 0.0013 17.8 [5, 24] 2.622e-005 0.3079 1.742e-005
Two months 0.2938 5 [-3,14] 0.05993 0.5543 0.03089
Four months 0.04944 -6.45 [-19.5, 0] 0.09788 0.05047 0.652
Legend: o (one sided)
Table 17: Signed differences by time horizon, TIMs vs TIPs
WMWo
Hodges-Lehman
TIM-TIP 95% CI
One month 5.957e-007 -20.5 [-29, -14.5]
Two months 0.01183 -7 [-12.5, 0]
Four months 0.0447 5 [0, 15]
o (one sided)
Table 18: Absolute differences by time horizon, TIMs vs TIPs
Two sample KS (TIM= 1)
|F1− F2| F1− F2 F2− F1
0.003432 0.00186 0.6745
Table 19: Absolute differences irrespective ot time horizon, TIMs vs TIPs
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P-Value P-Value P-Value P-Value
Type Statistic DF Tail 1-Sided 2-Sided Point Prob.
Asymptotic 4.382 1 .GE. 0.01816 0.03631
Exact 4.382 .GE. 0.0463 0.01266
Exact 229 .LE. 0.02378 0.01266
Table 20: Fisher’s exact test for table 11
D The HEXACO personality inventory
The conventional ‘Big Five’ personality traits (CANOE: Conscientiousness, Agreableness,
Neuroticism, Opennes, Extraversion) have been found to be unsatisfactory when used to
assess personality traits in non anglophone populations (see e.g. Lee and Ahston [22]).
For this reason we have instead relied on the HEXACO personality inventory, which
concentrates on six personality traits: Honest, Emotionality, eXtraversion, Agreableness,
Conscientiousness and Openness to experience. Each trait has five subtraits. Subjects
were asked a total of 60 personality questions, with each group of 10 assessing a different
trait. Given that we ’only’ have 192 subjects overall, we do not have enough data for a
proper analysis using these traits as regressors. However we report below some summary
statistics to show that the subjects in each treatment were fairly homogeneous in terms
of personality traits. We present these summary statistics both by treatment and by time
preferences in Tables 21 and 22. The HEXACO personality inventory questions in the
English version follow below (courtesy of Kibeom Lee and Michael C. Ashton).
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Mean Median Mode Maximum Minimum St. Dev.
Honesty Auctions 3.48 3.40 3.40 5.00 2.00 .65
BDM 3.41 3.25 3.20 4.70 1.90 .61
MPL 3.47 3.50 3.30 4.80 1.50 .70
Emotionality Auctions 3.01 3.00 2.80 4.70 1.70 .56
BDM 3.19 3.20 2.90 4.50 1.90 .59
MPL 3.10 3.20 3.30 4.30 1.80 .59
Extraversion Auctions 3.50 3.55 3.70 4.40 1.90 .54
BDM 3.46 3.45 3.30 4.50 2.50 .49
MPL 3.50 3.55 3.60 4.90 2.30 .52
Agreeableness Auctions 3.08 3.00 2.80 5.00 1.90 .65
BDM 2.88 2.90 2.70 3.90 1.40 .57
MPL 2.98 3.00 3.00 4.30 1.80 .58
Conscientiousness Auctions 3.55 3.70 3.70 4.90 1.00 .75
BDM 3.63 3.80 3.80 5.00 1.90 .70
MPL 3.61 3.60 3.60 4.90 2.10 .61
Openness Auctions 3.50 3.60 4.00 5.00 2.00 .64
BDM 3.43 3.55 3.70 4.70 2.10 .66
MPL 3.59 3.60 4.00 4.80 2.30 .65
Table 21: HEXACO personality traits - summary statistics by treatment
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Mean Median Mode Maximum Minimum St. Dev.
Honesty HUBO 3.51 3.50 3.10 4.70 1.50 .69
TIM 3.51 3.50 3.00 4.80 1.90 .64
TIP 3.30 3.30 3.30 5.00 1.90 .64
Emotionality HUBO 3.02 3.10 3.20 4.40 1.70 .64
TIM 3.08 3.10 3.10 4.50 1.80 .57
TIP 3.19 3.20 3.00 4.70 2.10 .56
Extraversion HUBO 3.49 3.60 3.60 4.50 2.30 .49
TIM 3.50 3.50 3.50 4.90 1.90 .52
TIP 3.46 3.50 3.60 4.60 2.20 .51
Agreeableness HUBO 2.91 3.00 3.00 3.90 2.00 .53
TIM 2.97 2.90 2.90 5.00 1.60 .61
TIP 3.05 3.00 2.80 5.00 1.40 .63
Conscientiousness HUBO 3.61 3.60 4.10 4.70 2.10 .59
TIM 3.63 3.70 3.70 5.00 1.00 .67
TIP 3.50 3.70 3.80 4.90 1.00 .79
Openness HUBO 3.49 3.60 4.00 4.80 2.20 .71
TIM 3.52 3.60 4.00 5.00 2.00 .66
TIP 3.48 3.50 3.80 4.80 2.00 .60
Table 22: HEXACO personality traits - summary statistics by time preference profile
D.1 HEXACO questions
DIRECTIONS
On the following pages you will find a series of statements about you. Please read each
statement and decide how much you agree or disagree with that statement. Then write
your response in the space next to the statement using the following scale: 5 = strongly
agree 4 = agree 3 = neutral (neither agree nor disagree) 2 = disagree 1 = strongly disagree
Please answer every statement, even if you are not completely sure of your response.
Please provide the following information about yourself.
Sex (circle): Female Male
Age: years
(we also added indication of the discipline to which student participants belonged)
1. I would be quite bored by a visit to an art gallery.
2. I plan ahead and organize things, to avoid scrambling at the last minute.
3. I rarely hold a grudge, even against people who have badly wronged me.
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4. I feel reasonably satisfied with myself overall.
5. I would feel afraid if I had to travel in bad weather conditions.
6. I wouldn’t use flattery to get a raise or promotion at work, even if I thought it would
succeed.
7. I’m interested in learning about the history and politics of other countries.
8. I often push myself very hard when trying to achieve a goal.
9. People sometimes tell me that I am too critical of others.
10. I rarely express my opinions in group meetings.
11. I sometimes can’t help worrying about little things.
12. If I knew that I could never get caught, I would be willing to steal a million dollars.
13. I would enjoy creating a work of art, such as a novel, a song, or a painting.
14. When working on something, I don’t pay much attention to small details.
15. People sometimes tell me that I’m too stubborn.
16. I prefer jobs that involve active social interaction to those that involve working
alone.
17. When I suffer from a painful experience, I need someone to make me feel comfortable.
18. Having a lot of money is not especially important to me.
19. I think that paying attention to radical ideas is a waste of time.
20. I make decisions based on the feeling of the moment rather than on careful thought.
21. People think of me as someone who has a quick temper.
22. On most days, I feel cheerful and optimistic.
23. I feel like crying when I see other people crying.
24. I think that I am entitled to more respect than the average person is.
25. If I had the opportunity, I would like to attend a classical music concert.
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26. When working, I sometimes have difficulties due to being disorganized.
27. My attitude toward people who have treated me badly is “forgive and forget”.
28. I feel that I am an unpopular person.
29. When it comes to physical danger, I am very fearful.
30. If I want something from someone, I will laugh at that person’s worst jokes.
31. I’ve never really enjoyed looking through an encyclopedia.
32. I do only the minimum amount of work needed to get by.
33. I tend to be lenient in judging other people.
34. In social situations, I’m usually the one who makes the first move.
35. I worry a lot less than most people do.
36. I would never accept a bribe, even if it were very large.
37. People have often told me that I have a good imagination.
38. I always try to be accurate in my work, even at the expense of time.
39. I am usually quite flexible in my opinions when people disagree with me.
40. The first thing that I always do in a new place is to make friends.
41. I can handle difficult situations without needing emotional support from anyone
else.
42. I would get a lot of pleasure from owning expensive luxury goods.
43. I like people who have unconventional views.
44. I make a lot of mistakes because I don’t think before I act.
45. Most people tend to get angry more quickly than I do.
46. Most people are more upbeat and dynamic than I generally am.
47. I feel strong emotions when someone close to me is going away for a long time.
48. I want people to know that I am an important person of high status.
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49. I don’t think of myself as the artistic or creative type.
50. People often call me a perfectionist.
51. Even when people make a lot of mistakes, I rarely say anything negative.
52. I sometimes feel that I am a worthless person.
53. Even in an emergency I wouldn’t feel like panicking.
54. I wouldn’t pretend to like someone just to get that person to do favors for me.
55. I find it boring to discuss philosophy.
56. I prefer to do whatever comes to mind, rather than stick to a plan.
57. When people tell me that I’m wrong, my first reaction is to argue with them.
58. When I’m in a group of people, I’m often the one who speaks on behalf of the group.
59. I remain unemotional even in situations where most people get very sentimental.
60. I’d be tempted to use counterfeit money, if I were sure I could get away with it.
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